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on the Law of Torts, Vol. II, sec. 458 would impose liability providing
the disease which is subsequently contracted is dearly the result of the
weakened condition of the plaintiff's system.
Two analogous groups of cases deal with recovery for injuries
aggravated by a later accident or improper treatment by a negligent
physician. In Hoseth v. Preston Mill Co., 49 Wash. 682, 96 Pac. 423
(19o8), the court remarked, "The rule is that the injured person must
exercise reasonable care to effect a cure, both as to the selection of a
physician and as to his own personal conduct, and if he does so he may
recover all damages flowing naturally and proximately from the original
injury."
So it has been held that the original wrong doer is liable also for the
negligent treatment by the physician. Loeser et al. v. Humphrey, 41
Ohio St. 378, 52 A.R. 86 (1884); Tanner v. Espery, 128 Ohio St.
82, I9O N.E. 229, 40 Ohio L.R. 646, 14 Ohio Abs. 672 (i934);
O'Quinn v. Allston, 213 Ala. 346, 104 So. 653, 39 A.L.R. 1263
(1925); Boa v. San Francisco-Oakland Terminal Rys., 182 Cal. 93,
187 Pac. 2 (1920). At least if such negligence ought reasonably to
have been anticipated, McIntosh v. Atchison T. and S. V. Ry. Co., I09
Kan. 246, 198 Pac. 1084 (1921); Purchase v. Seelye, 231 Mass.
434, 128 N.E. 413, 8 A.L.R. 503 (1918) ; and if not materially con-
tributed to by the plaintiff, Wright v. Blakeslee, 102 Conn. 162, 128
Am. n13 (1925).
Similarly the original wrongdoer has been held liable for subsequent
injuries to the plaintiff, such as the rebreaking of a leg if the plaintiff at
the time was in the exercise of due care, Stahl v. Southern Mich. R. Co.,
211 Mich. 350, 178 N.W. 710 (1910); Clayton v. Holyoke Street R.
Co., 236 Mass. 359, 128 N.E. 46o (1920); Postal Telegraph Cable
Co. v. Hulsey, 132 Ala. 444, 31 So. 527 (1901).
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TORTS
INTERFERENCE WITH PROBABLE EXPECTANCY OF RECEIVING
PROPERTY UNDER A WILL
By threats of violence and bodily injury, the defendant prevented
his wife from completing the execution of an unattested will which she
had drawn, and wherein she had provided a small legacy for the plain-
tiff, the sister of the decedent. After the death of the wife, the plaintiff,
seeking to recover the amount of the proposed legacy, sued the defendant
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in tort, alleging that although the decedent had continued to entertain
a settled purpose and intent to execute the instrument as a will, she was
prevented from doing so by the fright and fear induced by the defend-
ant. The Court of Appeals, affirming the trial court, held for the
defendant, ruling that a cause of action in tort can arise only out of the
invasion of a legal right, and that until such time as a gift might be
made to the plaintiff, she had no interest beyond a mere naked possibility,
an interest which was said to be "altogether too shadowy and evanescent
to be dealt with by courts of law." Cunningham v. Edward, 52 Ohio
App. 6i (936).
It is true that the testatrix was under no legal duty to leave the
plaintiff anything. If the testatrix had made a will in favor of the
plaintiff, she could have changed or destroyed it and the plaintiff would
have had no valid complaint. The plaintiff would have had no more
than an expectancy during the lifetime of the testatrix; and if no will had
been made, the interest of the plaintiff would be more evanescent than
the expectancy of a prospective legatee.
The question here, however, is not whether the plaintiff could main-
tain an action against the testatrix or her estate. The question is whether
the plaintiff may maintain an action against the defendant who inter-
fered with the probability that she would receive something from the
decedent. The second problem is not necessarily controlled by the first.
There is little law upon the exact facts of the principal case, but there
are cases which are, to some extent, analogous in which interference
with reasonable expectancies of economic and financial advantage has
been deemed tortious and legal relief granted.
In the early case of Keeble v. Hickeringill, K.B., I8O9, i i East
574, an action on the case was permitted to lie against a defendant who
frightened wild fowl away from the plaintiff's decoy pond by discharg-
ing gun powder, with intent to injure the plaintiff by driving away such
game. The court there stated that permitting legal redress for such
wrong "seems to be new in its instance, but is not new in the reason or
principle of it." Similarly, the defendant's conduct in threatening and
coercing workmen away from the plaintiff's quarry was held actionable
in case, in Garret v. Taylor, KB., 1620, Cro. Jad. 567.
In certain labor cases, the probability that employees will continue
to work for an employer has been recognized as a right that will be
protected against unjustified interference. In the leading case of Jersey
City Printing Co. v. Cassidy, 63 N.J. Eq. 759, 53 At. 230 (1902),
an injunction was granted to an employer whose labor supply had been
cut off by the defendant's threats of violence to potential employees,
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such interference being deemed an invasion of the right of employers to
have labor flow freely to them, a right which has been referred to as a
"probable expectancy." In many labor cases the probable expectancy is
that workers now employed by the plaintiff will continue to work for
him. In the Cassidy case the defendant did not interfere with any ben-
efit that the plaintiff was receiving, but the probable expectancy in labor
cases includes not only the workers now employed, but also others who
may wish to be employed by the plaintiff. The plaintiff's interest in the
property of the decedent in the instant case might well be compared with
the employer's probable expectancy of obtaining additional employees.
Further support for the plaintiff's position may be found in those
cases wherein the intentional or negligent conduct of the defendant
prevented a third person from giving aid to the plaintiff. So, where a
railroad company unlawfully blockaded a street crossing, thereby delay-
ing the fire department in reaching a fire, and it appeared that but for
such delay the dcpartment would have reached the fire in time to have
prevented it from spreading to another building, the railroad company
was held liable for the additional damage deemed to have resulted from
its negligence in thus blockading the street. Hourer v. The Chicago,
Milwaukee and St. Paul R. Co., 236 Ill. 620 (I9O8), A.L.I. Restate-
ment of Torts, Section 326. Similarly, where it was necessary, in
extinguishing a fire, to lay the water hose across a railroad track, and
the defendant railroad company negligently ran over and severed the
hose, thereby cutting off the water from the fire, which then consumed
the building, it was held in an action brought by the owner of the build-
ing against the railroad corporation that the defendants were liable for
the negligence of their servants in severing the hose. Metallic Compres-
sion Casting Co. v. Fitchburg Railroad Co., io9 Mass. 277, 12 Am.
Rep. 68 (1872), A.L.I. Restatement of Torts, Section 327. In the
foregoing case, the plaintiff would have no action against the fire depart-
ment if it failed to furnish the water. But since the fire department was
furnishing or attempting to furnish water, the defendant was held liable
to the plaintiff for his unjustified interference with the obtaining of the
water by the fire department.
Interference with the expectancy of receiving aid from a third per-
son was held actionable where a defendant railroad company obstructed
a highway, thereby preventing a physician from reaching the plaintiff;
the defendant was held liable for the damage resulting from the increase
in the plaintiff's illness, which would have been prevented had the high-
way not been blocked. Terry v. New Orleans Great Northern R. Co.,
103 Miss. 679, 6o So. 729 (1913), A.L.I. Restatement of Torts,
Section 328.
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Less frequently has the probable expectancy of a legatee of a will
been regarded as a right which the law will protect. In the leading case
of Lewis v. Corbin, 195 Mass. 520 (1907), the defendant prevented
the plaintiff's deceased father from receiving a legacy under the will of
the testatrix, by having a codicil, wherein the legacy was bequeathed,
executed in the presence of only one witness, the defendant knowing full
well that the laws of the jurisdiction in force at the time required such
execution in the presence of more than one witness. The court sus-
tained a demurrer to the petition, on the ground that the pleading was
defective in not -averring that the testatrix continued to entertain her
purpose in regard to the legacy, and that the fraud continued operative
to the time of her death and thus caused the loss to the plaintiff. How-
ever, by way of dictum, the court considered a charge of fraud a suffi-
cient statement of an actionable wrong, in that the fraud put the plaintiff
in a less advantageous position than he otherwise would have occupied
in reference to the probability of receiving property under the will, "and
this change of position, accomplished by fraud, naturally and probably
might deprive him of that which, with fair dealing, he would receive,"
and the defendant should, therefore, be chargeable with the natural
consequences of his act. The Lewis case is analogous to the principal
case in that in both it was the probable expectancy that the plaintiff
would receive something by will which was interfered with, and so the
dictum lends some support to the position of the plaintiff here.
In Kelly v. Kelly, 1o La. Ann. 623 (i855), the plaintiff alleged
that the defendants, by force and violence, had prevented the decedent
from completing the execution of a will, in which the plaintiff had been
named the sole legatee. The court held that while an action will lie
against one who by force and violence has prevented a person from
making a will in favor of the plaintiff, yet it cannot be maintained
without positive evidence that the execution of the will was prevented
by the threats and violence charged. The complaint was dismissed, due
to the failure of the plaintiff to prove such force and violence. In the
principal case it was admitted that the defendant's threats of violence
prevented the execution of the will containing the plaintiff's legacy; so
here again a dictum lends some support to the position of the plaintiff.
In Pettit v. Morton, 38 Ohio App. 348, 176 N.E. 494 (1930),
the defendant by forgery and fraud secured the execution of a false
will, and thereafter destroyed the true will, in which the plaintiff had
been named as devisee of valuable hotel property. In allowing the plain-
tiff to recover, it was decided that an unprobated will was not a "mere
nullity," and that it afforded the basis for a cause of action in tort.
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Whether this case lends any assistance to the plaintiff in the instant case
is debatable, in view of the fact that in the Pettit case the plaitniff was
the devisee under a fully executed will, while in the principal case, the
will was never completely executed.
In concluding the analysis of the possible tort action involved in the
instant case, it may be pointed out that there is a recent North Carolina
case in which the court permitted recovery in tort under facts strikingly
similar to those of the principal case. In Bohannon v. The Wachovia
Bank and Trust Go., 21o N.C. 679, 188 S.E. 390 (1936), the peti-
tion alleged that the decedent had formed the fixed intention and
settled purpose of providing for the plaintiff by will or trust instrument,
and would have carried out this intention but for the false and fraudu-
lent representations of the defendants. It was held that the plaintiff
could recover in tort for the malicious and wrongful interference with
the making of a will. This decision seems indicative of the tendency on
the part of the courts of law to allow redress in tort for interference
with expectancies, and it does not appear too violent to conclude that
this trend may reach the stage wherein the interest of the plaintiff in
the principal case will be recognized as a reasonable and probable
expectancy, in the nature of a property right, and that wrongful inter-
ference therewith may form the basis for a tort action.
Under the facts of the instant case, the constructive trust would
seem the most satisfactory method of affording redress to the defrauded
legatee. "It is eminently fitting that the court of equity should permit
the plaintiff, who has been grossly defrauded by the defendant, to
utilize the remedial process of the constructive trust," and have the
wrongdoer declared a trustee ex maleficio for the benefit of the wronged
party. Vanneman, "The Constructive Trust: A Neglected Remedy in
Ohio." 3 Ohio St. L.J. i, p. 6 (i937). In Seeds v. Seeds, ii6 Ohio
St. 144, 156 N.E. 193, 52 A.L.R. 76 (1927), a constructive trust in
favor of the plaintiff was impressed upon the title which a defendant
had secured by means of a forged will. Similarly, the court of equity
imposed a trust upon the title of an heir who took by inheritance but
suppressed the will by which the property was given to the younger sons
until the will was produced and probated. Hampden v. Hampden, 3
Bro. P.C. 550, i Eng. Rep. 1492 (1909).
A devisee was again declared a trustee ex maleficio in Winder v.
Scholey, 83 Ohio St. 204, 93 N.E. zo98 (i9io), wherein, at the time
of the devise, the devisee, then fully intending to perform, promised
the testator that he would hold the property for another, but after the
death of the testator and the probate of the will, refused to fulfill his
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obligation. The same result is reached more frequently when the
fraudulent intent not to carry out the promise made to the testator
existed at the time the devisee promised to hold for or convey to a
stranger to the title. McDowell v. McDowell, 141 Ia. 286, 119 N.W.
702 (1909); Smullin v. Wharton, 73 Nebr. 667, 103 N.W. 288
(905); Bogert, Trusts 135 (1921). So also, a constructive trust has
been imposed, where the will does not disclose either the trust or the
intended beneficiaries and the named devisees orally promised to hold
for them, Grimes v. Chew, 43 U.S. 619, ii L.Ed. 402 (1894);
Winder v. Scholey, supra, even though the will is an absolute devise.
Vanneman, op. cit., pps. 1-18.
In the Seeds case, sutra, Marshall, C. J., stated the doctrine as one
by which the court of equity prevents any person, who, from the relation
in which he stands to another is capable of exercising an undue influence
over his mind, from deriving a profit from any transaction which may
have arisen by reason of such opportunities of undue influence./ Unfortunately, the Ohio courts have been reluctant to adopt the
remedial device afforded by the constructive trust; Winder v. Scholey,
and Seeds v. Seeds, supra, must be classed as either contrary to the
weight of authority in the state, or confined to the facts. In Pettit v.
Morton, 28 Ohio App. 227, 162 N.E. 627 (1928), the court refused
to impose a constructive trust upon a defendant who, by forgery and
fraud, had secured the execution of a false will, and thereafter destroyed
the true wqill, in which the plaintiff had been named as devisee of certain
property. As previously noted, the plaintiff recovered in tort in a sub-
sequent suit. Pettit v. Morton, 38 Ohio App. 348, 176 N.E. 494
(1930). The Court of Appeals distinguished the Pettit case from the
Seeds case upon the ground that in the former the devisee was a stranger,
while in the latter he was an heir. This would seem to be a distinction
of no legal cogency. In Kent v. Mahaffey, io Ohio St. 204 (1859),
the court refused to impose a trust upon the title of a devisee, where a
blind testator was prevented by the deception of a disinterested person,
from burning his will, and on the death of the testator it was probated.
In both that case and the principal case, the court stated that an heir at
law could not be declared a trustee ex maleficio where, by force or
fraud, the heir at law prevents the execution of a will. It has been
pointed out by Olney, J., in Brazil v. Silva, i8I Cal. 490, p. 496; 185
Pac. 174 (i919), that this is precisely what Lord Thurlow had done
years before, in Dixon v. Olinius, I Cox. 414, 29 Eng. Rep. 1230
(i8o5), and it has received the approval of Lord Eldon, Mestover v.
Gillespie, ii Ves. 638; 32 Eng. Rep. 1230 (18o5), and of many
writers and judges since. See Vanneman, op. cit., p. 15.
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Thus, it appears that by the views taken by the Ohio courts in
Pettit v. Morton, supra, and Kent v. Mahaffey, supra, as to the inap-
plicability of the constructive trust, on the one hand, and that taken by
the principal case, refusing relief by an action in tort, on the other hand,
the defrauding party is unjustly enriched, and the decedent's intended
beneficiary stands remediless. "It is submitted that the existence of a
diabolical fraudulent intent and act on the part of * * * an heir who
induces his ancestor to die intestate * * * is sufficient and indeed pre-
cisely the sort of case to call forth from the chancellor his most effective
remedial device-the constructive trust." Vanneman, op. cit., p. 16.
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